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Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering
in Marine Fisheries
Jonathan H. Adler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The overall state of the world's fisheries is much worse today
than 45 years ago, even though most fisheries have come
under government regulation in this period. 1

Fisheries worldwide are in decline. Overfishing and poor
management have left numerous fish species in trouble. It is esti
mated that almost one-half of global fish stocks are fully exploited
and approximately twenty-two percent are over-exploited. 2 Even
those who otherwise question tales of environmental ruin acknowl
edge the plight of the world's marine resources. 3 The United
Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. This paper
was prepared for the National Fisheries Law and Policy Symposium at Roger Wil
liams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, June 28, 2002. The author would
like to thank Jonathan Entin, Bishop Grewell, Erik Jensen, Andrew Morriss,
Craig Nard , and Katrina Wyman for their comments on earlier drafts of this pa
per. Any errors or omissions remain those of the author.
1. Ralph Townsend, Producer Organizations and Agreem~nts in Fisherie,,:
Integrating Regulation and Coasian Bargaining 222 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (prepared for the Political Economy Research
Center's (PERC) Thirteenth Political Economy Forum "Evolving Property Rights
in Marine Fisheries" at Big Sky, Montana).
2. Louis W. Botsford et aI., The Management of Fisheries and Marine Ecosys
tems, 277 SCI. 509, 509-10 (1997) (citing estimates of the American Fisheries Soci
ety that forty-four percent of fish stocks are "fully to heavily exploited," sixteen
percent are "over-exploited," and six percent are "depleted"). Of additional concern
is that fishery landings have shifted "down" the food web from larger fish to
smaller fish and invertebrates, suggesting that existing catch levels are unsustain
able. Sec Daniel Pauly et aI., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SeT. 860 , 860
(1998); see also J.F. Caddy et a!., How Pervasive Is "Fishing Down Mari ne Food
Webs?," 282 SCI. 1383a (1998); Daniel Pauly et aI., Response (1998), at http://
www.sciencemag.org/cgilcontentifulV282/5393/1383a (on file with author).
3. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Prologue: En vironmentalism for the Twenty-First
Century , in Tm; TRUE STATE OF THl> PLANET 4 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995); see also
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States is no exception. The National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) identified sixty-five overfished species in its latest report
to Congress. 4 The status of an additional 589 species is unknown. 5
While NMFS reports the number of healthy fish species has in
creased in recent years, such gains have come at tremendous cost
to local fishing communities faced with fishery closings and other
stringent conservation measures. Nearly three decades of federal
regulation have failed to provide for the sustainable utilization of
America's marine resources.
There is a need to rethink the near-exclusive reliance upon
government management to protect marine resources. Efforts to
design fishery management regimes that allow for substantial har
vests while conserving fish populations have largely failed. Even
where the necessary management measures can be identified, po
litical influence impedes their adoption and effective implementa
tion. Well-intentioned fishery regulation has failed to conserve
fish stocks. Fortunately, there are alternatives to consider.
There is substantial, yet inadequately explored, potential for
private ordering and other nongovernmental solutions to environ
mental problems. Order can emerge from the spontaneous interac
tion of community members or common resource users. Such
private ordering can produce, and has produced, resource manage
ment regimes that could supplement, and in some cases, replace
existing regulatory institutions for fishery management. Yet ob
stacles must be overcome to realize the full potential of such man
agement alternatives. It is well-known that coordination and free
rider problems can frustrate the development of nongovernmental
institutions. Less well-explored is the possibility that existing le
gal rules inhibit the emergence of community-based :rules and con
servation regimes. In the fisheries context, one such obstacle is
antitrust law, which acts to obstruct cooperative management ar
rangements that, by reducing harvest levels, mimic the effects of
.06-08 (2001) (acknowledging
that numerous ocean fisheries a re overfiRhed and suffering declining yields, and
that futu/'e increases in fish production will come from aquacuJtme and fish farm
ing, rather thap ocean fish eri es).

f:,Y0RH LOI,IP,OIlG, THE SKEI-'TTrAL E NVlIlON MBNTAJ.l S T

4. NAT'L MAHI NE FISl ILRIES S '·:l;V., 107TH CariG., TOWARD }{" :lJl ·II .Dn-:c
AwtEllIrA'S '!'clSTTI<:RlES: AN1\TAL RI':PU HT TO CONGHI':SS ON TIll': 0TATl 'S OF U.s. FISH·

EIVES-200l J 1-12 tbl. 1 (2002), auailable at htLp://www,pmfs.noaa.gov/sfaJreports.
hL-nl.
5. {d.
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cartels. Understanding how antitrust law and other legal
frameworks can facilitate or frustrate private ordering is necessary
to unleash the potential of nongovernmental institutions.
Part II of this Article surveys the challenges of marine conser
vation, the failures of existing regulatory regimes, and the poten
tial for property rights in marine resources. Part III discusses the
nature of private ordering, providing examples that arise from the
fisheries context. Part IV discusses how legal rules can inhibit pri
vate ordering. That section focuses in particular on how antitrust
law has impeded cooperative fishery management. Part V then ex
plores possibilities for overcoming antitrust obstacles to private or
dering. This Article concludes with some broader thoughts about
the implications of this research for resource conservation.
II.

THE CHALLENGE OF MARINE CONSERVATION

It is a commonplace to observe that for natural resources - as
for other types of wealth - "everybody's property is nobody's
property. " 6

Conservation of marine fisheries presents the archetypal
"commons" problem, most famously detailed by ewlogist Garrett
Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons. 7 Hardin described the
fate of a common pasture, unowned and available to all. 8 In such a
situation, it is in each herder's self-interest to maximize his use of
the commons at the expense of the community at large. Each
herder captures all of the benefit from adding one more animal to
his herd. The costs of overgrazing the pasture, however, are dis
tributed amongst every pasture user. When all the herders re
6. Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL.
ECON. 116, 116 (1955). Aristotle made the same point far earlier. See ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS §1261.b32 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Trevor J . Saunders ed., Penguin Books
1981) ("[TJhe greater the number of owners, the less the respect for common
property.").
7. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). While
Hardin is most commonly associated with this analysis, the commons problems in
the context of the fishery was described several years earlier in H. Scott Gordon,
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954). See also Scott, supra note 6.
8. Hardin, supra note 7. It is important to note that Hardin's argument ap
plies to open-access commons. Historically, common pastures were rarely open
access, and were typically protected by common property rules, customary norms,
or other restraints on consumption. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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spond to the incentives created by the open-access nature of the
commons, the pasture is overgrazed. "Each man is locked into a
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a
world that is limited."9 The pursuit of self-interest in an open-ac
cess commons results in a tragedy; "[f]reedom in a commons brings
ruin to all."lo
This analysis applies well to most marine fisheries.H So long
as there is open-access to the fishery, each fisher has an incentive
to catch as much as possible, even beyond the point of sus
tainability. These incentives are strong in the fishery context as
the marginal cost of increased fishing effort for an active fisher is
often quite small compared to the potential economic reward.
Fishers do not benefit from self-restraint because none has any as
surance that other participants in the fishery will follow suit.
A.

Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons

The "tragedy of the commons" is not inevitable. If access to
the common resource is controlled, and consumption restrained,
the commons can be conserved. The initial choice of solutions to
the commons problem, as described by Hardin, is between political
controls and some form of private property. "The tragedy of the
commons . . . is averted by private property, or something formally
like it," Hardin explained, but where private property is lacking,
the commons can only be saved by "mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon."12 In either case, "we seek the definite social ar
rangements that will keep [the resource in question] from becom
ing a commons."13 As Hardin presented the problem, conservation
of the commons requires privatization or regulation. Whichever
course is chosen, the aim is the same: control access and limit
use.14
9. Hardin, supra note 7, at 1244.
10 . ld.
11. See Gordon, supra note 7,
12, Hardin, supra note 7, at 1245, 1247.
13 . id. at 1247 .
14. See Randall Bess & Michael Harte, The Role of Property Rights in the De
velopment of New Zealand's Seafood industry, 24 MARINE POL'y 331, 331 (2000)
("The challenge for any fisheries policy and management system is to determine
and enforce harvest levels that will sustain fish stocks and access rights to
fisheries. ") ,

•

•

•

2002]

LEGAL OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE ORDERING

13

The creation of property rights is the most obvious means of
preventing the tragedy of the commons. 15 As a general rule, where
resources are owned, there is less concern about their overuse.
Property owners have both the ability to protect the owned re
source, and a substantial incentive to ensure that the value of their
property - both to themselves and to others - is maintained. As
Harold Demsetz explains, "[1]f a single person owns land, he will
attempt to maximize its present value by taking into account alter
native future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that
one which he believes will maximize the present value of his pri
vately-owned land rights."16 Conversely, the lack of property
rights provides substantial incentives against resource
conservation. 17
Not only do property rights provide incentives for better stew
ardship, they also foster private ordering by reducing the costs of
15. Gordon, supra note 7, at 134 ("Environmental conditions make necessary
some vehicle which will prevent the resources of the community at large from be
ing destroyed by excessive exploitation. Private or group land tenure accomplishes
this end in an easily understandable fashion."). See generally David Schmidtz, The
Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND TH E ENVlRONMENT (Roger E .
Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (explaining "how property institutions
convert negative-sum or zero-sum games into positive-sum games»).
16. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON . REV.
347, 355 (1967 ). "The development of private rights permits the owner to econo
mize on the use of those resources from which he has the right to exclude others."
Id. at 356. It is important to note that Demsetz's claim is not that every private
landowner will act in this fashion, just that the incentives of ownership are such
that the typical landowner will act in this fashion . As is true in all contexts, the
behavior of specific individuals will vary, with some taking greater or lesser ac
tions to maximize the present value of the property in question. Those property
owners who do the best job of estimating likely future income streams are then
rewarded in the marketplace with greater property values . See Robert J. Smith,
Resolving the Tragedy uf the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in
Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) (''Wherever we have exclusive private owner
ship, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking,
there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource."). But see
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Ail': Foul' Propositions About Property Rights and En
vironmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 103, 117-25 (1999) (arguing
there are many environmental problems for which property rights are not the
"first-best" solution).
17. Scott, supra note 6, at 116 ("No one will take the trouble to husband and
maintain a resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion
of the product of his management; that is, unless he has some property right in the
yield."). Again, while it may be an overstatement to claim that "no one" will act in
such a manner, this is clearly a case in which the exception proves the rule.
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negotiating over remaining externalities.l 8 Thus, it may not De
necessary to establish property rights in all relevant resources to
achieve a substantial amount of cost internalization. Conversely,
the mere existence of externalities is often attributable to the ab
sence of property rights and the consequent rights to contract. 19
The creation of property rights is not always an option, how
ever. Property rights can be difficult to define, monitor, and en
force. 2o In some cases the costs of establishing property rights will
be greater than the benefits. 21 There may also be political, cul
tural or social obstacles to their creation. In the context of fisher
ies, individuated private property rights in fisheries are generally
lacking because many species are mobile across vast expanses and
access is difficult to monitor.22 These factors, among others, make
it particularly costly to define and enforce property rights in the
marine context. 23 Property rights in fisheries have also been disfa
vored in American law. 24 Various legal doctrines, including that of
the public trust, hold that fisheries are held in trust by the govern
18. See Schmidtz, supra note 15, at 120 (explaining how property rights re
duce the transaction costs involved with internalizing externalities).
19. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non
Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 51 (1970).
20. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L. & ECON . 1, 15-16
(1960). See generally Bruce Yandle & Andrew P . Morriss, The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons,
28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 139-41 (2001); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill , The Evolu
tion ofProperty Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J .L. & ECON. 163, 165-67
(1975).
21. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Im 
provement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 438 (1985).
22 . See GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 73-74 (19il9).
23_ See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Ref<
ulation: The Case of the Fishery, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1019 (1982) (noting how
heterogeneity among fishers, including differences in productivity, can hamper
support for property-based fishery management); Bonnie J. McCay, Social and
Ecological Implications of ITQs: An Overview, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MCMT. 5
(1995) (summarizing the various political concerns, such as "social equity, stew
ardship, and what this means for public ownership," related to ITQs). See Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENVTL_ L. 241, 255-65 (2000), for other obstacles to the creation of property
rights in fisheries.
24. The United States Supreme Court has even gone so far as to state that "it
is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish , birds or animals. Neither the States
nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fi sherma n or hunter, has
title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture."
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U .S. 265,284 (1977).
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ment for the common use of all citizen s 25 For these reasons, most
fishery conservation efforts of the past several decades have relied
upon government regulation.
It is now generally accepted that traditional regulatory ap
proach es to fishery conservation have been a "spect acular fail
ure."26 Regulatory controls h ave typically taken the for m of limits
on fishing seasons, boat size, fishing areas, equipment and t he like.
These measures are inefficient, in part, because they are all indi
rect means of conserving fish stocks. However well-intentioned,
such rules often lead to "absurd" results. 27 License controls and
other entry rest rictions may limit the number of fishers, but they
do not control the amount or intensity of fishing efforts .28 Man
dates on the type of equipment that can be used, an effort to con
trol total catch by mandating that fishers use less-efficient means
of catching fish, encourage fishers to increase their investment in
additional vessels or gear to compensate for the efficiency losses.
Limits on the number of days fished encourage fishers to increase
their effort on those days allowed. The results are rampant over
capitalization in fisheries and a destructive "derby" system in
which each fisher races to catch as much as he or she can before
the season closes. Even in the r egulated marine commons, "ruin is
the destination toward which all men rush."29
25. See, e.g., Douglas F. Britton, Comment, The Priuatization of the American
Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public Tru st, 3 O CEAN & COASTAL L.J.
217 (1997) . The state constitution of Alaska provides that "[wlherever occurring in
the natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for their
common use." ALASKA CONST. art . VIII, § 3. It is also worth noting that state regu·
lations limiting fishery access in such a fashion so as to privilege state residents
are suspect. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (discussing the theory of
government ownership of fisheries); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876);
Dobard v. State, 233 S.w.2d 440 (Tex. 1950); Dodgen v. Depuglio, 209 S.W.2d 588
(Tex. 1948).
26. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisher
ies: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L Q. 813, 813 (1997).
27. Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Fishing for Property Rights to Fish ,
in TAKING THE E NVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 161, 162 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yan
dle eds., 1993); see also MICHAEL DEALESSI, FISHI NG FOR SOLUTIONS 31-35 (1998)
(summarizing the impacts of fishery regulation).
28. See J ohnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1016; E .A. Keen, Common Prop 
erty in Fisheries: Is Sole Ownership an Option ?, 7 MARINE POL'y 197, 200 (1.983)
(summarizing research documenting the failure of limited entry to reduce fishin g
effort).
29. Hardin, supra note 7, at 1244.
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In Alaska's halibut fishery, for example, as th e government
shortened the fishing season to prevent overfishing, fishers re
sponded by purchasing larger, more powerful boats and accelerat
ing their catch. 30 Eventually, the halibut season was compressed
from several months to only a few days.31 Fishery regulations pro
duced overcapitalization while r educing the value of the fish
caught. The resulting "race to fish" also increased the occupational
hazards faced by halibut fishers. 32 Regrettably, this pattern has
been repeated in many fisheries . Even where regulators set a total
allowable catch (TAC) for t h e fishery , overcapitalization and the
"race to fish" ensue. As James Wilen notes, "without a property
rights syst em attached to the resource itself, the open access incen
tives still operate."33
There are numerous reasons for the failure of traditional regu
latory controls. For starters, centralized governmental authorities
face many obstacles in seeking to provide optimal levels of environ
mental pr otection. 34 Perhaps the greatest deficiency facing cen-
t r alized regulatory authorities is the difficulty in centralizing
sufficient knowledge to allocate r esources in an efficient manner.
As Nobel Prize-winning economist F.A. Hayek explained, "[Tlhe
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never
exist s in concentrated or integrated form , but solely as the dis
persed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge
which all the separate individuals possess."35 In other words , ef
30. Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish , in GOVERNMENT VERSUS ENVI
RONMENT 48 (Donald R. Lea l ed. , 2002).
31. [d.
32. [d.
33. J a mes E . Wilen , Property R ights and the Texture of Rents in Fisheries 54
(J a n . 2002) (unpublished m a n u script, on file with a uth or) (prepar ed for PERC's
Thirteenth Political Economy Forum "Evolving Proper ty Rights in Marine Fisher
ies" at Big Sky, Montana).
34. Steven F . Edwards, Ownership of Renewable Ocean Resources, 9 MARIN I':
RESOURCE ECON. 253, 257 (1994) (" [Glove rnm ent f.:tilure a r ises because it is diffi
cult to define or quantify a commodity, demand is not known, a lack of competition
inhibits accountability a nd innovation, or government sta keholders are able to
gain pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of income.") (citing C. WOLF, JR., MAR
KETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (MIT Press
1988)).
35. F.A. Hayek , The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519
(945); see also F .A. Hayek, The N ew Confusion About Planning, in NEW STUDlI:o:S
IN PHILOSOPHY, P OLITICS, E CONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 232, 236 (1978)
("The chief reason why we cannot hope by central direction to achieve anything
like th e efficiency in the use of resources which the market makes possible is that
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fective fishery management depends upon all manner of local and
technical knowledge beyond the reach of any centralized manage
ment agency.:i6 As a result of this "knowledge problem," well-in
tentioned fishery management schemes have failed time and
again. "The technological resourcefulness of fishermen has histori
cally made a mockery of the most stringent and carefully crafted
command and control regulations aimed at reducing fishing effort,"
note Shi-Ling Hsu and James Wilen. 37 Even expert regulators fail
to anticipate the unintended consequences and feedbacks their
regulations can induce.
Politics also hampers the ability of regulators to safeguard
fishery resources.: 18 Fishery management councils are often sub
ject to political pressure to increase the total allowable catch in a
given season. Where scientific assessments of sustainable catch
levels are uncertain, as is typically the case, there is substantial
pressure to adopt less conservative assessments. 39 Without cer
tain property rights in future catches, fishing interests have no in
centive to endorse precautionary catch levels. This pressure can
cause a "ratchet effect" that pushes fishing levels above sustaina
ble levels. 40 The problems of poor regulatory management have

the economic order of any large society rests on a utilization of the knowledge of
particular circumstances widely dispersed among thousands or millions of individ
uals."); HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) ("Federal regulators never have been and never
will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information neces
sary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements
of particular locations and pollution sources."). For a longer discussion of the
"knowledge problem" in environmental policy, see Jonathan H . Adler, Let 50 Flow
ers Bloom: Transforming the States into Laboratories of Environmental Policy , 31
E NVTL. 1. REP. 11284, 11286 (2001),
36. Ralph Townsend , Fisheries Self-Governance: Corporate or Cooperative
Structures?, 19 M AH I N!!: P0L'y 39, 39 (1995) ("Local communities have extensive
information about the resource and about the industry and its technology that is
very useful in designing effective rules.").
37. Shi-Ling Hsu & James E . Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY 1.Q. 799, 806-07 (1997).
38. See Leal, supra note 30, at 43 .
39. AA Rosenberg et al., Achieving Sustainable Use of Renewable Resources,
262 SrI. 828, 829 (1993); see also Thompson, supra note 23, at 258-59.
40. Botsford et aI., supra note 2, at 512; Donald Ludwig et aI., Uncertainty,
R esource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons from History, 260 SCI. 17, 17
(1993); Rosenberg et aI., supra note 39, at 828-29.
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been combined by other government policies, such as subsidies,
which further encourage overcapitalization and overfishing. 41

B.

Property R ights Revisited

The failure oftraditional regulations, and the recent success of
alternative management strategies, has renewed interest in the
potential use of property rights for marine conservation. As al
ready noted, there is a substantial body of academic research de
tailing why property rights regimes should improve the efficacy
and efficiency of resource management. 42 This work is not merely
theoretical, however. There is a growing body of research docu
menting how various sorts of property institutions, particularly va
rious common property regimes or de facto property rights regimes
grounded in custom or contract, have evolved in various societies
to address potential common pool resource concerns.43
Comparative analyses of private and political resource man
agement are instructive.44 Oyster beds in Maryland are managed
by the state. 45 In neighboring Virginia, the beds are leased to pri
vate parties,46 while in Washington, oyster beds are privately
owned in fee simple. 47 As the theoretical literature would predict ,
privately managed oyster beds are healthier and more productive
than t hose under state protection. 48 Comparisons between pri
41. See Leal , supra note 30, at 49-54.
42 . See supra notes 10-17.
43 . See, e.g., THE P OLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AN D CULTURE: INFORMAL
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T . Simmons
eds. , 1993) [hereinafter INFORMAL SOLUTIONS]; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNI NG TH E
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
44. Comparative institutional an a lysis avoids the "nirvan a" problem in which
an obviously imperfect institutional arrangement is com pared with a h ypothesized
ideal norm. As Harold Dem setz expla ins, this appr oach attempts "to assess which
alternative real institutional arrangement seems best able to cope with the eco
nomic problem ." Harold Demset z, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,
12 J.L. & ECON . 1, 1 (1969) (emphasis added).
45. See Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P . Donnelly, Prices and Property
Rights in the Fisheries, 42 S. E CON. J . 253, 260 (1979).
46. See id.
47. Michael DeAlessi, Fishing fo r S olutions: The S tate of the World's Fisheries,
in EARTH REPORT 2000 94-95 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000) .
48. Id.; see also Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P . Donn elly, Property Rights
and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J. L. & E CON. 521 (1975) (comparing the
productivity of Maryland and Virginia oyst er fish eries).
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vately leased and publicly managed oyster beds in Louisiana and
Mississippi, respectively, yield similar r esult s.49
The effect of private ownership can also be seen in the explo
sion in aquacult ure production, which m ore than tripled between
1985 and 1995. 50 Aquaculture now accounts for approximately
one-quarter of global fish harvests , and one-third of fish harvested
for h uman consumption.51 The explosion of aquaculture is rele
vant to the discussion of property right s in marine resources be
cause the fundamental differen ce between aquaculture and
traditional ocean fisheries is the "degree of control" which, "at its
core, is largely defined by the strength of property rights ."52
Aquaculture operations are privately owned in their ent irety. As a
result, producers need not worry about the t ragedy of the commons
and, therefore, have t he incentive "to tinker, to experiment, an d to
innovate" in order to increase the productivity of their facilities.53
Aquaculture production is not without problems,54 but the explo
sion in aquaculture production, when contr asted to the depletion of
marine fisheries, illustrates the importance of property rights in
conserving resources.
The interest in property rights is also buoyed by the practical
experience in several countries with property-based management
systems, such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Under an
ITQ system, the government sets the total allowable catch for a
given season, and then allocates shares of the catch - quota - to
individuals, boats, or firm s as a form of transferable right. ITQ
programs have been implemented in several countries with sub
stantial success at increasing fishing efficiency, r educing overcapi
t alization, and lessening the ecological impact of fishing
operations. 55 Particularly significant , ITQs have encour aged fish
ers to exercise greater stewardship. "It's t he first group of fish ers
49. Agnello & Donnelly, supra n ote 45.
50. DeAlessi, supra note 47, a t 109.
51. J a m es L. Anderson , Aquaculture and the Future: Why Fisheries Econo
mists S hould Care, 17 MARINE RESOUHCE E CON. 133, 134 (2002) .
52. [d . Of course, increased a qua culture production can contribu t e to oLher
environmental con cerns. See DEALESSI, supra note 27, a t 54-55.
53. DEALEsSI, supra n ote 27, at 54.
54. See id. a t 54-57.
55. See, e.g ., lIANNE H. GISSUHAHSON, OVEHFISHINC: THE IcE LANDIC SOLUT ION
(In st. of Econ . Affairs ed. , 2000); R. Qu enti n Grafton et a I. , Private Property and
Econom ic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool R esource, 43 J. L. &, ECON. 679
(2000); Robert Repetto, The A tlantic Sea Scallop Fishery in the US. and Canada:
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I've ever encountered who turned down the chance to take more
fish," noted Philip Major of New Zealand's Ministry of Agriculture
after the implementation of ITQs.56 There have also been private
initiatives to allocate annual harvests among firms in catch-lim
ited fisheries so as to create quasi-property rights and capture the
economic and ecological benefits that result. As discussed below,
such cooperatives may develop where government resource manag
ers have failed to implement ITQs or other property-based man
agement regimes. 57
Property rights in natural resources do not require a sole pro
prietor of the resource. Ownership, even "sole-ownership," can
take many forms, including a cooperative, corporation, family 01'
community organization.58 What is most important is that the
property be allocated on a "scale" sufficient to eliminate - or at
least mitigate - a commons problem. Whether the owner of a given
resource is an individual, a corporation, or a community, the secur
ity of the property right enables the owner to plan the present and
future use of the resource so as to maximize the resource's present
value, which includes the discounted value of future harvests. 59
There are numerous examples of local, community-based fish
ery management regimes that could be characterized as "common
property" regimes. 60 Such regimes "are a way of privatizing the
rights to something without dividing it into pieces."61 Typically,
such regimes "have evolved in places where the demand on a re
source is too great to tolerate open access, so property rights in
resources have to be created, but some other factor makes it impos
sible or undesirable to parcel the resource itself."62 The rules gov
erning the use of the fishery are somewhat informal, often arising
A Natural Experiment in Fisheries Management Regimes, YALE SCH. FORESTRY &
ENVTL. STUD. (2001).
56. DeAlessi, supra note 47 , at 99 (quoting Philip Major of New Zealand's
Ministry of Agriculture after the implementation of ITQs).
57. S ee infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
58. See Scott, supra note 6, at 116.
59. See id. at 122.
60 . S ee, e.g., Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries: Avoiding the 'Tragedy
of the Commons' 2 (Jane S. Shaw ed., PERC Pol'y Series, Issue No. PS-7, 1996);
OSTROM , supra note 43.
61. Margaret McKean & Elinor Ostrom , Common Property Regimes in the
Forest: Just a R elic from the Past?, 46 UNASYLVA 3, 6 (1995 ) (noting that "common
property is shared private property.").
62. [d.
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out of local custom or community practice. The management ~'e
gimes typically evolved over time to increase the returns to the
users of the resource. H. Scott Gordon observed that in most
"primitive" societies, property rights of one form or another in re
newable resources were common and served to ensure "orderly ex
ploitation and conservation of the resource."63 There have been
efforts to adopt formal collective rules to limit catches and conserve
the underlying resourt::e, though such efforts have been challenged
in court.64
As noted earlier, the mobility of many fish populations can
make property rights in fish populations costly to define and en
force . These costs are, in part, a function of existing tecrinology.65
Over time, human ability to define and mark territories or monitor
given populations of a species improves, facilitating the application
of property-based institutions. During the initial settlement of the
American West, it was difficult to define and enforce property
rights due to the vast expanses and relative lack of fencing materi
als. As populations increased, and the ability to assert control over
water, grazing lands, and cattle herds became more important, the
demand for technologies to define and enforce property rights in
creased. These pressures spurred the development of barbed wire
and complex branding systems. 66 In much the same way, such
branding and fencing technologies are beginning to emerge in the
marine context, and may facilitate the further expansion of prop
erty rights in fisheries.67 Such innovations range from fish scale
analysis, which approximates branding or fingerprinting and catch
sampling technologies, to remote tracking of fishing vessels using
satellites and autonomous underw9.ter vehicles (e .g. "robo-tuna").68
The application of property rights to marine conservation does
not only face economic and technical hurdles. The adoption of enl
63 . Gordon , supra note 7, at 134.
64. See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
65. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 20.
66. Anders on & Hill, supra note 20, at 165-67.
67. See Daniel Huppert & Gunnar Knapp, Technology and Property Rights in
Fisheries Management, in T HE TECHNO LOGY OF PI' )PERTY RIGHTS 79-99 (Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 2002); DEALESS I, supra note 27, at 48-53.
68. See DEALESSI, supra note 27 , at 49-52; Huppert & Knapp, supra note 67,
at 88-94; see also Gregory B . Chris tainsen & Brian C. Gothberg, The Potential of
High Technology for Establishing Tradable Rights to Whales, in T HE TECHNOLOGY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 101-21 (200 1).
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modest property-based systems is politically controversial. 69 ITQs
can improve efficiency and facilitate conservation, but they may
also lead to the redistribution of wealth or displacement of tradi
tional fishing communities. 70 Although ITQ systems have been
implemented in a few U.S. fisheries,71 Congress en acted a morato
rium on the adoption ofITQs in additional fisheries in 1996.72 The
moratorium is due to expire, yet Congress is expected to impose
new requirements on the adoption and operation offuture ITQ sys
tems in U.S. waters.73 Thus, while it is generally accepted that a
move toward greater property right s in marine resources would be
beneficial , such a move faces substantial obstacles.

III.

PRIVATE ORDE RING

Order emerges perfectly from chaos not because of the way peo
ple are bossed about, but because of the way individuals react
rationally to incentives. 74

Property r ights are often created by government action. Stat
utes or regulations may recognize or create rights in a previously
unowned resource, such as radio spectrum,75 or expand the num
ber of sticks in the bundle of rights associated with a particular
resource. Examples of the latter would include the recognition of
conservation easements in land 76 or instream flow rights to water
69. See Scott C. Matulich et al. , Fishery Cooperatives as an Alternative to
ITQs: Implications o{ the Amel'lcan Fisheries Act, 16 MARlNE RESOURCE ECON. 1, 1
(2001) (noting the continuing resis t ance to property rights approaches to fishery
conservation).
70. See McCay, .~ upra Dote 23, at 5 (summarizing the benefits of a nd potential
concerns with ITQs).
71. Id.
72. Susta inable Fisheries Act § 108, 16 U .S .C. § 185.3 (1996) (es t a blishing a
moratorium on new fishery management plans from J anuar y 4, 1995 u ntil October
1, 2002).
73. See, e.g., More Time {or IFQs, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2002, a t A8.
74. MA'n RlDLEY, Ti-m ORIGI NS OF VIRTUE : HUMAN INSTINCTS AND TI-m E VOLlJ
TION OF COOPERATION 238 (1996).
75. See, e.g. , Thomas W. H a zlett, Assigning Property R ights to Radio Spec
trum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529
(1988).
76. See generally GERALD KORNG OLD, P RIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS:
EASEMENTS, REAL COVE NANTS, AND E QUITABLE SERVITUDES (1990). It should be
noted th at conservation easem ents are n ot without their problems. See, e.g., Julia
D . Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA.
L. REV. 739 (2002).
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in the western United Stat es .77 In each case, the resource in ques
tion - land, water - could be owned, but legislative action ex
panded the rights associated with the resource. In other cases,
government entities may simply recognize rights that are observed
and accepted within a local community.
Yet government is not the sole source of order and de facto
property rights may emerge absent government action.78 Harold
Demsetz hypothesized th at property rights emerge when the bene
fits of property arrangements exceed the costs of defining and en
forcing such rights. In his words, "property rights develop to
internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become
larger than the cost of internalization."79 The relative costs and
benefits of property rights are a function of many variables, includ
ing existing property rights, economic values, technology, cultural
norms and relative homogeneity, and changing envir onmental con
ditions, among other factors.8o The absence of property rights in
complementary resources can increase the costs of enforcing any
arrangements designed to limit the access to a common resource as
welI.Bl
There is a rich history of property and quasi-property arrange
ments developing organically (spontaneously) outside of the state's
formal apparatus, though such developments are often later recog
nized and sanctioned by the state. 82 This history supports the
claim that "informal social networks are capable of creating rules
that establish property rights."83 Robert Ellickson's hypothesis is
that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms
whose content serve to maximize the aggregate welfare that mem
77. S ee TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PR[M[NG THE
I NV fSfBLE P UMP 111-32 (1997).
78 . See generally RO BE RT C. ELLICKSO N, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGH
BORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
79. Demsetz, supra note 16, at 350.
80. S ee id.
81. Cheung, supra note 19, at 52.
82. See, e.g. , INFORMAl. SOLUT[ONS, supra note 43; Elinor Ostrom, Reformu
lating the Commons, in PROTECTING TH E COMMO NS: A FRAMEWORK FOR R ESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE AME RICAS 17-20 (Joanna Burger et al. eds. , 2001) and the
sources cited therein. A similar phenomenon has been documented in the area of
intellectual property. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intel
lectual Property Rights and Collectiue Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293
(1996).
83. ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 203.
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bers obtain in their workaday affairs with one another."84 The
"close-knit" nature of the group can arise from cultural homogene
ity, such as that which one may find in an isolated community, or
from close contact over time due to shared experiences or occupa
tions. 85 These norms, which constrain behavior much as formal
legal rules, limit behavior within the group for mutual advantage.
Such norms are the means through which many earlier societies
avoided the "tragedy of the commons" in common pastures and the
like. 86 They also can help to define or reinforce the group's cohe
sion. 87 These understandings can be formalized, as when courts
recognize the longstanding traditions about who owns which
whale,88 but can also remain unsanctioned.
A noteworthy example of long-lasting, informal property
rights in action are the "harbor gangs" of Maine's lobster fisher
ies. 89 Only gang members are allowed to harvest lobsters in desig
nated areas. 90 There is no formal legal prohibition on outsiders
fishing in gang territories, but the boundaries are defended
through self-help.91 The regime exists "only because ofthe benign
neglect of the state."92 If warnings to observe traditional territo
84. [d. at 167. Wealth-maximizing norms are those norms that "minimize the
members' objective sum of (1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight losses arising
from failures to exploit potential gains from trade." [d. at 184.
85 . See Terry L. Anderson & Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the
Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 73, 79
(1999). The potential for norms that facilitate cooperation may be due as much, if
not more, to repeated interactions than cultural homogeneity. Jonathan Macey
suggests that it is "repeated interactions, not the closely knit nature of the groups,
that leads to cooperation ." Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and
the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1123, 1131 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL.
ETHICS 49 (1985 ); OSTROM, supra note 43.
87. ELLlCKSON, supra note 78, at 234-35 ("Constitutive norms can enhance
group solidarity by structuring dealings in a way that requires members continu
ally to reaffirm their ongoing trust.").
88. See, e.g., Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696).
89. See generally James J. Acheson, Capturing the Commons: Legal and Ille
gal Strategies, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM 69-83 (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Sim
mons eds. , 1992) (hereinafter Acheson, Capturing the Commons] . See also JAMES
J . ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) [hereinafter ACHESON, LOBSTER
GANGS].
90. ACHESON, LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 89, at 48.
91. See id. at 49.
92. Acheson, Capturing the Commons, supra note 89, at 80.
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ries are not heeded, gang members will cut the buoy lines on the
lobster traps of the offending fisher. 93 H . Scott Gordon notes that
the harbor gangs effectively create "local monopol[ies]" that limit
entry and consumption. 94 Where such measures are successfully
enforced, they reduce overcapitalization and increase incomes in
what would otherwise be open-access fisheries. 95 Political develop
ments have weakened some of the territorial claims, but where the
informal territories are enforced, lobster catch productivity is
higher and fishing pressure is reduced. 96
Ellickson's research on property norms in the whaling indus
try during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further sup
ports the hypothesis that people in close-knit groups will tend to
develop norms to govern workaday situations common to the
group.97 Specifically, whaling communities developed substantive
norms governing the right to capture and recover whale car
casses. 98 Each rule encouraged whaling by rewarding the ship
that first harpooned the whale, while also allowing for others to
harvest seemingly abandoned whales that had been killed or
wounded by another ship.99 Which rule a given fishery adopted
was dependent upon the type of whale most commonly hunted
there. A norm that a ship owned a whale, dead or alive, so long as
the whale was fastened by a line or otherwise secured to the ship,
made sense for slow and "mild" tempered whales, such as right
whales. loo A different norm was required "in fisheries where the
more vigorous sperm whales predominated."lol The history of the
whaling industry demonstrates that "informal social networks are
capable of creating rules that establish property rights."102 Also
notable in this case is that whalers appear to have adopted as
norms the particular set of rules that maximized social welfare
given the particular circumstances of each fishery.lo3
93. Id. at 74 .
94 . Gordon, supra note 7, at 134.
95. See id.
96 . Acheson, Capturing the Commons, supra note 89, at 74.
97. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth -Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989).
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id.
100 . Id. at 89.
101. Id. at 90.
102. Id. at 94.
103. Id. at 87-88.
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Whaling norms did not just "mimic" law; in effect "they cre
ated law."104 Whalers t reated the norms as binding, and generally
agreed upon which norm was applicable in which circumstance. 105
Where conflicts arose, it tended to be because there was a factual
dispute about whether a given ship or salvager h ad satisfied the
requirements of the governing norm. Ellickson r eports that courts
routinely applied the governing norm to whaling disputes, rather
than applying law from an external source. lOG
One benefit of private ordering is the tendency to reduce the
costs of rule creation. Rules that evolve from local cultural norms
may require less effort to enforce than externally imposed r ules. 107
When rights are established by those within the community
("residual claimants"), there is greater incentive to minimize the
costs of rights creation and enforcement. 108 This is due in part to
the fact that the community in question will bear the costs of r ights
definition and enforcement, and reap the benefits of the economic
surplus generated by right creation. On the American Western
Frontier, for example, residual claimant organizations, such as cat
tlemen's associations and mining camps, created more efficient
property rules than did legislative measures such as the Home
stead Act. 109 Also, nongovernmental responses to changing eco
nomic conditions are often more rapid than governmental
responses. 110 In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that, where it
may operate, "private ordering generates substantive legal princi
ples that are superior to those that the state produces."1l1
A weakness of such informal systems is that they have diffi
culty with outsiders . Informal systems work only sc long as all
those participating understand the common rules, or if the infor
mal entity has a means of excluding outsiders or enforcing rules.
On the Western Range, for example, cattlemen established cus
tomary range rights, enforced by line camps and cattlemen's as
104. Id. at 85.
105. Id. at 88.
106. S ee id. at n.5 and the cases cited therein .
107. Townsend, supra note 36, at 40.
108. S ee Anderson & Hill, supra note 20, a t 443. This a lso may be a n argument
in favor of "corporate" ra ther than "cooperative" governance structures to manage
common pool resources. Townsend, supra note 36, at 40-43.
109. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 20, at 443-48.
1l0. Cheung, supra note 19, at 68.
llI. Macey, supra note 85, at 1140.
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sociations. Jl2 Newcomers were excluded from the range by
excluding them from participation in the annual cattle r oundups
that were necessary to run cattle on the range.113 This system be
gan to break down when sheepherders entered the Western Range.
Sheepherders had no need to participate in the annual roundups,
so it was difficult to exclude them from the range and maintain the
customary range right system.1 14
With growth in size and heterogeneity, private ordering gener
ally needs to become more formal if it is to survive. Custom and
practice will either become recognized by the formal legal system 
e.g., common law court decisions recognizing the customary rules
or the understanding will become formalized through legislation or
written contracts. Collective institutions, such as neighborhood
associations, resource user cooperatives, and the like, can be cre
ated with formal responsibilities. In such cases, contracting re
places customary dealing. This can create new problems, however,
as the costs of contracting can be greater than the costs of reaching
a shared understanding in a small homogenous community. None
theless, the operational principle is the same, and contracting will
occur where the benefits to be gained are greater than the transac
tion costs involved.lI5
The private creation of rights and obligations through contract
can be particularly valuable - and costly. On the one hand, con
tracts embody the contracting parties' subjective valuations of po
tential outcomes. Thus, contracts are far superior to government
regulations and other third-party controls at reducing dead-weight
losses.l 16 At the same time, the transaction costs involved in con
tracting and enforcing contractual agreements can be particularly
high.117 Norms that arise from cultural homogeneity or common
understandings can reduce such costs, but such norms do not al
ways exist. In the fishery context, such contract-facilitating norms
are more likely in those industries, areas, and communities in
which the participants have an extended course of dealing. It is
112.
11:l.
114.
115.
cide to
1131.
116.
117.

S ee, e.g., Anderson & Grewell, supra note 85, at 80-82.
Id. at 81.
[d. at. 82.
Additionally, "there is no reason why unrelated entities cannot simply de
become closely knit when it is in their interest." Macey, supra note 85, at
ELLICKSO N,

Id.

supra note 78, at 246 .
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also worth noting that the dividing line between contract and "cus
tom" is often illusory. As Steven Cheung notes, "[S]ome asserted
'customs' are, in fact, market practices in which the contractual
terms are not obvious."118 They are contracts nonetheless.
IV.

OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE ORDERING

The process of private ordering is not wholly independent of
positive law. Existing legal rules and institutions affect the viabil
ity of such arrangements and the trajectory of their development.
Native Americans had well-established property rights to fishing
sites along the Columbia River prior to the arrival of European set
tlers. Later, these rights were effectively destroyed by the State of
Washington, which imposed its own rules governing local fisher
ies. 119 Legal traditions can also facilitate, or inhibit, reforms that
would facilitate private ordering.
As discussed above, private ordering occurs when the benefits
gained from such arrangements exceed the related transaction
costS. 120 Legal institutions have a tremendous impact on such
costs. The recognition, valuation, and enforcement of private prop
erty rights, for example, can facilitate private ordering by clarify
ing the legal entitlements of those engaged in negotiations,
contracts, or other interactions. The lack of property rights mud
dies the water, obscuring the nature and extent of the relevant le
gal entitlements, thereby increasing the transaction costs. At the
extreme, "the prohibition of voluntary negotiations makes the cost
of transacting infinite."121
Of particular interest for this paper is the effect that antitrust
law has on the potential for private ordering in marine fisheries. 122
118. Cheung, supra note 19, at 57 n.16.
119. See Robert Higgs, Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington
Salmon Fishery, 7 RES. ECON. HIST. 55, 55-56 (1982).
120. See supra notes 78-81.
121. Demsetz, supra note 16, at 348. Demsetz's claim here is obviously an ex
aggeration - illegal negotiations and contracts are quite common - but the point is
quite valid . Indeed, it is common knowledge that legal prohibitions greatly in
crease the transaction costs of negotiation, particularly for otherwise law-abiding
citizens.
122. The conflict between antitrust law and marine conservation is explored in
further depth in Jonathan H. Adler, Antitrust Barriers to Cooperative Fishery
Management, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES (Donald Leal
ed., forthcoming 2003) and Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through Collusion
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) .
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Where the costs of transacting or coordinating are low in compari
son to the potential gains from such organization, fishers will or
ganize various collective institutions to enhance fisher income,
manage fish harvests, and support conservation. Such organiza
tions traditionally operate to regulate fishing activity and, in many
cases, limit the entry of newcomers. Under existing antitrust law,
however, such arrangements are often illegal as agreements "in re
straint of trade."123 Even if antitrust law's prohibition does not
make the cost of such arrangements "infinite," it does increase the
relative costs of such institutions , undermining their viability. If
the likelihood of private ordering is a function of the relative costs
and benefits of such institutional development, a legal rule that
significantly increases the costs of private ordering can effectively
prohibit such developments.
The conflict between conservation and antitrust law arises be
cause what the former demands, the latter condemns. The aim of
antitrust law is to protect consumers from anti-competitive con
duct that reduces output and increases prices for consumers. Ar
chetypal anti-competitive conduct is the creation of a "horizontal"
agreement among competitors - a cartel - that seeks to raise prices
for a good or service to super-competitive levels by reducing out
put. Such arrangements are illegal under the Sherman Actl 24 be
cause such arrangements have the tendency to reduce consumer
welfare.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is
a good example of the sort of horizontal cartel prohibited under
U.S. law. 125 OPEC members seek to increase the price of crude oil
by collectively agreeing to reduce production to set levels. Ironi
cally, were OPEC concerned about the conservation of its petro
leum reserves, it might engage in the very same behavior - cutting
oil production - which would have the same effect on consumers 
increased prices. Users of a common pool resource who wish to
123 . See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) .
124. [d. §§ 1-7.
125. OPEC has been described as "the greatest cartel of our time. " W. KIp VIS
CUS I ET AL., E CONOMIGS OF RGGULATION AND ANTITRUST, 611-13 (2d ed. 1995).
OPEC is also a good example of how cartel restrictions can be difficult to enforce
a bsent a viable enforcement mechanism. The more successful the cartel is at rais
ing prices, the greater the incentive each member has to cheat. See generally 1
HANDBOOKOF IN DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 425-30 (Richard Schmalens ee & Richard
D . Willig eds ., 1989).
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conserve that resource typically have little choice but to reduce
their consumption. Such restraint may help conserve the resource,
but it will also reduce consumer welfare insomuch as it leads to
higher prices. Indeed, the most direct agreement to constrain con
sumption of a common-pool resource to sustainable levels will con
stitute a per se violation of antitrust law. As the Supreme Court
explained in 1940, "a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per
se. "126 As a result, if it is necessary to reduce the consumption of a
natural resource, such as a marine fishery, only the government is
permitted to adopt such conservation measures. The same mea
sures adopted voluntarily by the users of the resource are against
the law.
The history of the Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Associ
ation (GCSOA) provides a good example of the way antitrust law
inhibits private ordering in marine fisheries. The GCSOA was cre
ated in the 1930s to increase shrimpers' revenue by regulating
shrimp harvests and controlling prices along the Mississippi Coast
in the Gulf of Mexico. 1 2 7 The GCSOA negotiated exclusive con
tracts with local packers.128 GCSOA members could only sell their
catch to contracting packers, and the packers agreed to pay GC
SOA members a minimum price.l 29 GCSOA rules also served to
exclude new entrants from the fishery.l3o
The GCSOA was successfully prosecuted for an illegal price
fixing arrangement under the Sherman Act. 131 To be sure, the
umon did set prices with shrimp packers in an effort to increase its
members' incomes, but not in the fashion ordinarily targeted by
antitrust enforcement. The minimum prices served a conservation
126. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U .S. HiO, ::'. 23 (1939). Anti
trus t doctrine has become a bit more nuanced since 1939, but the Socony-Vacuum
case is still considered the "definitive statement" of the law regarding price-fixing.
RI CHARD A. POS N E R, ANTITRUST LAW 36-37 (2d ed. 2001).
127. Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 100S.
12S. See w.
129. Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v. United Statc<i, 236 F .2d 65S,
660 (5th Cir. 1956). It is worth noting that the GCSOA members did not merely
agree to set prices amongst themselves. See Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at
100S. Contracts with the packers were necessary to ensure that union members
complied with the union's rules . See id.
130. See Gulf Coast Shrimpers, 236 F.2d at 661.
131. [d. at 65S.
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purpose. '::.'he prices were set based upon the size of the shrimp,
measured in tails per pound. I32 The minimum price for small
shrimp set by the GCSOA was generally set above the market
price; the price for larger, more valuable shrimp, was not. I33 In
this fashion, the price scheme discouraged the harvest of small, im
mature shrimp early in the shrimping season because the proces
sors would be reluctant to meet the required price. This ensured
there would be larger and more valuable shrimp for harvest later
in the season. Their efforts were successful, as Mississippi shrimp
prices were generally higher than those in neighboring Louisiana,
largely due to the greater proportion of larger shrimp in the har
vestp 4 As Gary Libecap notes, this price scheme, combined with
GCSOA's power to restrict entry (assert property rights) to the
fishery, increased member incomes, even though they sold their
shrimp to a national market. I35
The GCSOA experience shows that "private gTOUp regulations
of fisheries could be an alternative to government regulation ifthat
option were politically acceptable."136 Indeed, decades after the
prosecution of the GCSOA for antitrust violations, Gulf states were
enforcing shrimp harvest regulations on minimum shrimp size
that had the same effect 137 The government regulations, however,
made no effort to limit entry to the fishery.l38 As a result, the Gulf
shrimp fishery is overcapitalized. By the late 1980s, it was esti
mated that the annual shrimp catch could be harvested with one
third the number of boats. 139
Gulf Coast Shrimpers &: Oystermans Ass'n v. United States
was not an isolated case. In the 1930s and 1940s there were sev
eral antitrust actions against fishers' unions throughout the coun·
try. 140 Sometimes the cases were brought by government
authorities. In others, private plaintiffs used the antitrust stat
Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23 , at 1008.
LIBI';CAP, supra note 22, at 88.
[d. at 89; Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1010 n.21.
LIBECAl', supra note 22, at 88.
[d. at 90.
Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1009·10.
[d. at 1009-10.
S ee Lea!, supra note 30, at 45·46.
Se(', e.g., Local 36 of Int'l Fishermen & Allied Workers of Am. v. United
State~, 177 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1949); Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. Int'! Long
shoremen'::; & Warehousemen'::; Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1947); Columbia
River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970 (D. Or. 1939).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140 .
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utes to seek treble damages against the defendants. 141 In each
case, the aspects and practices of the fishers' unions that provided
potential conservation benefits were precisely what made them ob
jectionable to antitrust enforcers. Patrick McHugh and the Atlan
tic Fisherman's Union, for instance, were prosecuted because they
"effectively limited the quantity and species of fish landed in New
Bedford."142 Regardless of whether McHugh was a forward-look
ing conservationist or a price-gouging rent-seeker, his union
helped prevent overfishing. As the court explained, "[Hlad it not
been for defendants' illegal restraints, a 'much greater' volume of
scallops and other fish would have been brought into and sold in
the port of New Bedford."14:3
Another notable case involves the California sardine fishery.
In 1940, Frank Manaka sued the Monterey Sardine Industries,
Inc., a cooperative association of fishing boat owners, and the Del
Mar Canning Co. for conspiring to set prices and restrict entry into
the California sardine flshery.144 Under an agreement among the
association, the cannery, and the local fishermen's union, the asso
ciation set the price for which its members' fish were sold to the
cannery.145 The assocIation served both pecuniary and conserva
tion purposes. On the one hand, it restricted entry by non-local
fishers and helped maintain high fish prices and member profits.
On the other hand, it limited harvesting, thereby helping to con
serve fish stocks.] 46
As in the GCSOA case, the court found the association in viola
tion of federal antitrust law. The district court held that:
[Sluch an association as that of the boat owners is not freed
from the restrictive provisions of the anti-trust act, because
they profess in the interest of conservation of important food
fish to regulate the price and the manner of taking such fish
141. Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), any person who is
injured by actions which are illegal under federal antitrust law may file suit in
federal district court, id., and may seek recovery of "threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." [d. § 15.
142. McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252, 254 (1st Cir. 1956).
143. [d.
144. Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941).
145. [d . at 533.
146. Afte r Manaka waR prevented from selling fish in Monterey, the associa
tion offered to let him come back to fish to replace a local boat which had been
disabled. [d. This suggests that at least one purpose of the association was to
maintain an upper limit on the harvest level.
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"unauthorized by legislation and uncontrolled by proper
authority."147
In other words, the association's conduct was no less exclu
sionary because it served, in part, to conserve fish stocks. An
agreement among otherwise-competing users of a common pool re
source to conserve the resource by restricting their aggregate out
put is illegal. Monterey Sardine Industries was found guilty of
conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, and
Manaka was awarded triple damages under the Clayton Act. 148
If anything, the ruling in Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus
tries had worse effects on conservation than did the GCSOA case.
In the 1930s, the California sardine fishery was at its peak, yield
ing over 500,000 tons of fish per year. 149 By the early 1950s, the
fishery was beginning to collapse; "the pressures on the fishery
were too great, and by 1952 for all practical purposes, the commer
cial sardine fishery was finished."l!iQ Perhaps the timing of the
fishery's collapse is coincidental. 151 The collapse may have been
inevitable so that sardine harvest levels would have depleted the
fishery even if Monterey Sardine Industries' collusive arrangement
had been permitted to survive. On the other hand, antitrust law
may have destroyed a well-functioning cooperative institution that
was capable of forestalling or mitigating the sardine fishery's
collapse.
The bulk of the reported antitrust prosecutions against fisher
unions occurred during the 1940s and 1950s. 152 Yet the reverbera
tions of these cases are still felt in fisheries. "The mere threat of
antitrust investigation adds another chilling breeze to the already
147. Id. at 534 (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp.
970, 975 (D. 01'. 1939)).
148. Id. at 536; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
149. LIBECAP, supra note 22, at 76.
150. Id. at 77.
151. For an historical account discussing other factors in the fishery's collapse ,
see ARTHUR F . McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND THE LAW IN THE
CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 153-55 (1986).
152. Major cases included: Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S.
520 (1942); McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1956); Local 36 ofInt'l
Fishermen & Allied Workers of Am. v. United States, 177 F .2d 320 (9th Cir. 1949);
Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941); Hawaiian
Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 72 F.
Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1941). Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1008 n.9. There
are exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Miss.
1993).
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challenging climate for forming community organizations to con
serve natur al resources."153 Subsequent efforts to create coopera
tive ventures have been threatened with prosecutionJ54 This
chilling effect is particularly powerful because the Clayton Act pro
vides for treble damages in successful private antitrust enforce
ment actions. 155 This creates a powerful incentive for fishers to
stay well clear of those activities that could run afoul of antitrust
laws .156 Surveying self-governance arrangements in fisheries,
Ralph Townsend encountered substantial reluctance by fishers in
the United States and Canada to discuss such arrangements for
fear of government regulation or prosecutionYi7
In defense of antitrust enforcement, it is important to note
that most of the collective fisher organizations prosecuted for anti
trust violations were motivated by pecuniary interest. It appears
that the union organizers were more concerned with increasing the
incomes of their membership than in preserving our world's
marine heritage. It is also the case that not all collective arrange
ments designed to increase fish prices had conservation effects. In
at least one case, the court in question found that demand was suf
ficiently inelastic that the local union's efforts to drive up prices
would not have reduced consumption. 15fl Nonetheless, in most
cases it appears the collusive arrangements reduced harvest levels ,
thereby relieving, if not altogether eliminating, pressures on local
fish populations, and that the unions were aware of the potential
conservation benefits of their actions. There should be little doubt
that some opportunities for conservation were lost due to the pros
ecution of such arrangements. If nothing else, the collusion among
fishers created collective entities with interest and ability in con
153 . Bruce Yandle, Antitrust and the Commons: Cooperation or Collusion?, 3
THE INDEP. REV. 37, 50 (1998).
154. See J ohnson & Libecap, supra note 23 , at 1007 n.8 (stating that the Fed
era l Trade Commission warned that voluntary agreements to limit the number of
boats in the fishery would violate the Sherman Act).
155. 15 U .S.C . § 15(a) (2000).
156. The modest exemption provided under the Fisherman's Collective Market
ing Act is insufficient to mitigate this effect. S ee Joseph M. Sullivan, Harvesting
Cooperatives and U.S. Antitrust Law Recent Developments and Implications 3-4,
at http://oregonstate.eduideptJIIFET/2000/papers/s ullivan.pdffJuly 11, 2000) (pre
pa red for "Microbehavior and Macroresults: ITFET 2000" at Oregon State Univer
sity, July 11, 2000).
157. Townsend, supra note 1, at 257.
158. See Hawaiian Tuna Packers , Ltd v. Int'I Longshoremen's & Warehouse
men's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1947).
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serving the underlying resource t h at CQuld well have safeguarded
the resource as conservation concerns became more acute. 159
V.

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES

The threats of wasted and destroyed fi sheries, extinguished
species, and diminished water quality in rivers are real, but
the possibilities that associated monopoly restrictions will im·
pose sig nificant costs on the economy are purely speculative
and, if realized, are apt to be small and fleeting. 160

The obstacles to private ordering in marine fisheries are not
insurmountable. Even the restrictions Imposed by antitrust law
can be mitigated, if not avoided altogether through informality. If
arrangements are not formalized, they may not be subject to anti
trust prosecution. Not all collective arrangements among fishers
are formalized in contracts. Particularly in local, homogeneous
communities, cooperation among otherwise-competing firms or in
dividuals may be facilitated by customs and cultural norms. 161 As
noted above, lobstermen in Maine have effectively divided local
lobster fisheries into discrete territories and informally agreed to
limit the lobster catch. 162 Harbor gangs enforce these boundaries
among themselves and against outsiders. Were these agreements
formalized, however, they would almost certainly be illegal. Infor··
mality may lessen the risk of antitrust prosecution, but it also can
undermine the effectiveness of the collective arrangement. As a
result, the property rights are less secure and depend upon the
community's ability to maintain relative homogeneity and
agreement.
In recent years, modest fisher cooperatives have gained ac
ceptance under antitrust law.l 63 In some U .S. fisheries, resource
users have found it possible to create cooperative entIties to assist
with fishery management and allocate shares among fishers de
spite the strictures of antitrust law. The cooperatives are created
to rationalize the fishery management and address overcapitaliza
159. See LIBE CAP, supra note 22, a t 90 (noting that the "success" of the various
unions "indicates that private group regulations of fisheries could be an alterna
tive to government regulation if that option were politically acceptable").
160. Yandle, supra note 153, at 40.
161. OSTROM , supra note 43.
162. See supra notes 89-96.
163. See generally Sullivan, supra note 156.
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tion, waste, and inefficiency through the creation of de facto ITQ
systems. Historically, such collective entities were considered
"within the 'market allocation' class of per se violations that are
illegal" under federal antitrust law.1 64 In fisheries where catch
limits have already been imposed by regulatory authorities, how
ever, the federal government has been more receptive to coopera
tive arrangements, such as harvesting cooperatives, that allocate
catch shares among licensed fishers.
One example of such a cooperative is the Pacific Whiting Con
servation Cooperative (PWCC). Prior tG creation of the PWCC, the
U.S. Pacific Coast whiting fishery was subject to strict catch limits,
fishing licenses were limited but transferable, and the total catch
allowed was divided among several classes of fishing firms: on
shore processing plants, "mothership" processors, and catcher/
processors. I65 Within each class the fishery adopted an "olympic"
system, whereby any licensed fishing firm was entitled to catch as
much of the harvest allocated to its class as it was able. In prac
tice, this encouraged a race to fish, as each fishing firm sought to
harvest as many fish as it could within a short period of time so as
to capture the greatest share of the harvest allocated to its class.
While the total catch limit helped conserve the fishery, the compet
itive pressure of the "olympic" system fostered overcapitalization,
inefficiency, and waste, including substantial by-catch - the inci
dental catching of non-target fish species. The race to fish was so
intense that under the existing rules, the pressure to catch fish
quickly was so great that the entire quota would be harvested in
just fourteen days.I66
By 1996, there were only four catcher/processors left in the
fishery.I67 These firms recognized that the allocation of property
rights to portions of the catch - ITQs or some other share alloca
tion - would yield substantial benefits. Specifically, the firms rec
ognized they could cut costs and increase product recovery by as
much as twenty-five percent by allocating quota shares, thereby
164. Id. at 2.
165. A "mothership" processor is a ship that has on-board processing capability
but does not itself catch fish. A catcher/processor is a ship that catches and
processes its own fish on-board.
166. Bruce Ramsey, Compan ies Agree to End "Race for Fir:h," SJ·;ATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1997, at B8.
167. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 4.
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eliminating the race to fish. 168 The formal creation of ITQs in the
fishery was not an option, however, due to a Congressionally en
acted ITQ moratoriumJ69
To obtain the benefits of a property-based management sys
tem, the catcher/processors created the PWCC.1 70 Because there
were so few firms involved, each sharing a common interest, the
coordination costs were low enough to reach a quick agreement on
how to divide the catchJ71 They further agreed to make their allo
cations transferable among each other.l7 2 The Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department consented to the formation of the coop
erative because the four firms agreed to continue processing, mar
keting, and selling their products on a competitive basis, and
because the agreement would not further reduce fishery output. 173
Joel Klein, the then-acting Assistant Attorney General for Anti
trust, observed that the harvest allocation was "unlikely to reduce
output or increase price under any scenario."174 To the contrary,
due to increased efficiency, the cooperative would increase the vol
ume of fish available to consumers from the same harvest level.
The results of the cooperative were impressive. As under ITQ
programs, "more efficient operators leased shares from less effi
cient ones" and firms reduced the number of fishing vessels in the
fishery.175 The recovery rate - the amount of saleable product re
covered from fish - increased substantially. Indeed, the four firms
produced over five million pounds more food from the same volume
of fish caught - often of higher quality - while using fewer
boats. 17o At the same time, by-catch declinedJ77 To enforce the
arrangement and prevent cheating, the cooperative contracted
with a fishery harvest monitoring service, which also enabled fed
168. [d.
169. [d. at 1. Sullivan uses the term individual fishing quota (lFQ).
170. See id. at 4-6 .
171. Ramsey, supra note 166; see Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5.
172. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5.
173. Ramsey, supra note 166.
174. Id.
175. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5.
176. J. Leblanc, United States' Fishery Cooperatives: Rationalizing Fisheries
Through Privately Negotiated Contracts , in FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 404/
2-USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Ross Shotton ed., Food &
Agric. Org. 2000).
177. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5; Leblanc, supra note 176.
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eral regulators to increase t he accuracy of the seasonal catch
allocation. 178
The PWCC was so successful that it spawned another private
harvesting agreement in the North Pacific pollock fishery, t he Pol
lock Conservation Cooperative.1 79 This development was facili
t ated by t he American F isheries Act,180 which subdivided the
pollock fishery much like the whiting fishery was divided. 18l
Again the Justice Department declined to prosecute, citing the po
tential pro-competitive impacts of t he cooperative.182 In 2002, a
cooperative in Alaska's Chignik salmon fi shery began as well.1 8 3
Creation of the whiting and pollock harvesting cooperatives
was facilitated by the imposition of tot al catch limits in each fish
ery. With fishery output already limited by regulation, antitrust
enforcers had little reason to fear that market allocation among
fi shery participants would reduce consumer welfare by further re
ducing out put and increasing prices. Indeed, by eliminating the
"race to fish ," the market allocation agreements had the opposite
effect . The cooperatives also produce some ecological benefit, most
notably the reduction in bycatch and greater seasonal balance in
fishing patterns. Cooperatives also have some advantages over
qu asi-property rights schemes in that they are "unencumbered" by
th e sorts of restrictions on concentration, leasing, and transfer t hat
are imposed on ITQ regimes.1 84
Congress could further facilit ate private ordering in fisheries
by providing explicit stat utory authorization for the creation of
fishing cooperatives or conservation associations. This could be
achieved either by enacting a blanket antit r ust exemption or by
expanding the limited exemption provided by the Fisherman's Col
178. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 6.
179. AT-SEA PROCESSORS Ass'N, PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT OF THE POLLOCK
CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE (Dec. 1999), at ht tp://www .atsea.org (on fi le with
author ).
180. P ub. 1. No. 1 05-~77 , 112 Stat. 2681-616 (1998).
181. This h istory is sum marized in Matulich et a!., supra note 69, at 2-4.
182. P ress Release, United States Departmen t of J ustice, 00-86, J ustice De
part ment Approves Proposal by the Pollock Conservation Cooperative (Feb. 29,
2000) , available at http ://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2000/February/086at.h tm .
183. Wesley Loy, Co-op Revolutionizes Chig nik Fishery, ANC HORAGE DAILY
NEWS, J une 22, 2002 , at D1.
184. Keith R. Criddle & Seth Macinko, A Requiem for the IFQ in U.S. Fisheries,
24 MARINE POL'y 461 , 465 (:(·000)
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lective Marketing Act.l 85 An alternative would be to create a
mechanism whereby NMFS or regional fishery management coun
cils could authorize .the creation and operation of a fishing
cooperative.
The devolut ion of management authority from government
agencies to resource user organizations h as proven successful in
New Zealand, where man agement r esponsibility for the southern
scallop fishery has been devolved to the Challenger Scallop En
hancement Company (CSEC), a private association of quota hold
ers within the fishery.186
The New Zealand government created formal ITQs in the fi sh
ery in the mid-1990s. 187 The creation of property rights in the fi sh
ery through the ITQs reduced the t ransaction costs associated with
creating a collective self-governing institution for the fishery.188
Once t he ITQs were allocated, the quota holders organized into the
CSEC to facilitate stock enhancement efforts, such as seeding, and
to develop harvesting rules. 189 Among other things, the CSEC de
termines where and when fishing can occur, manages enhance
ment efforts, supports research , an d collects funds from its
members. 190 The CSEC conducts an annual survey of scallop
stocks and oversees a shellfish safety program. 191 Merely creating
ITQs or other property rights in fishery stocks would facilitate the
formation of similar entities in U.S. fisheries. Yet more is possible.
The CSEC not only coordinates fishing activities and supports
enforcement like the pollock and whiting cooperatives, it also has
management responsibilities that would be prohibited under U.S.
law. Most notably, the CSEC has de facto responsibility for setting
185. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (1997) .
186. Basil M. H . Sharp, New Zealand's Fisheries Man agement 162 (unpub
lished manuscript, on file with a uthor) (prepared for PERC's Thirteenth Political
Economy Forum "Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries" at Big Sky,
Montana).
187 . [d. at 150.
188 . S ee Townsend, supra note 1, a t 257-60; Anthony Scott, Obstacles to Fish
r ry Self-Government , 8 MARINE R E OURC E ECON. 187, 196-97 (1993).
189. Sharp, supra note 186, a t 162; Townsend , supra note 1, a t 247.
190. Sharp, supra note 186, at 162.
191. Townsend , supra note 1, at 249 (stating that the CSEC "has taken on the
full range of activi ties tha t many presume only a government can manage: shell
fish safety, research, stock enhancement, management and enforcement of catch
levels, and resolution of gear conflicts among fish eries") .
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harvest levels and quotas,192 The New Zealand Minister of Fisher
ies still sets a total allowable catch for the scallop fishery, but this
level is set well above the level that is fished. 193 Through the
CSEC, scallop quota owners lease a substantial portion of their
quota holdings back to the CSEC where they are held and not
fished.1 94 In other words, the CSEC has taken responsibility for
controlling the harvest level by limiting the output of its members
below those levels set by the government. 195 Such action would be
a per se violation of antitrust law in the United States. 196
If legislative or administrative measures to facilitate private
ordering in marine fisheries are not forthcoming, it is possible that
cooperative associations may find relief in court. Courts often rec
ognize that agreements in restraint of trade serve additional pur··
poses, such as the need to overcome free-rider problems or produce
off-setting efficiencies. 197 In principle, there is no reason why such
analysis should not accommodate conservation efforts. Specifi
cally, there is no reason why the conservation benefits of a collec
tive entity should not be weighed against its potential anti
competitive conduct. This is particularly true in the case of conser
vation, where what antitrust condemns is that which conservation
requires. As Bruce Yandle, a former economist at the Federal
Trade Commission observes, "cooperative efforts by fishermen to
restrict access to a commons, thereby sustaining a fishery , serve
the joint interests of the fishermen and consumers."19R
If nothing else, increasing globalization of fish markets and in
creased competition from aquaculture should reduce antitrust
scrutiny. Concerns about anti-competitive conduct are at their na
dir when those engaged in allegedly anti-competitive conduct do
not have market power. If shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico, for
example, engage in collusive behavior to restrict their catch and
shift the shrimp harvest to later in the season, this is only a con
192. Townsend, supra note 1, at 247; see Sharp, supra note 186, at 162.
193. Townsend, supra note 1, at 247.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. It is worth noting that the CSEC needed to obtain an exemption from lim
its on aggregate quota holdings designed to limit concentration within the indus
try.ld.
197. See RI CHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28-32 (2d ed. 2001 ) (discussing
the beneficial effects of monopolies in cases with defendants who are "benign
cartels").
198. Yandle, supra note 153, at 49.
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cern if they have the ability to increase market prices for shrimp.
If, however, shrimp harvested from other locations competes di
rectly with Gulf shrimp, the ability of the Gulf shrimpers to re
strict market output and increase market prices is limited, and
antitrust concerns should abate. "In the absence of government
sanctions that block competitive entry, it is difficult to see how re
gional fishing associations . . . could effectively cartelize major
product markets."199 With global markets, fisheries will compete
with one another - and with other food sources - for market
share. 20o
The development of fisher cooperatives in several fisheries,
however modest, illustrates that some private ordering will occur
so long as there are substantial benefits to be gained therefrom. In
other words, where the costs of private ordering are less than the
costs of maintaining the status quo in fisheries, some amount of
private ordering should occur. Addressing legal obstacles to such
developments, such as antitrust law's prohibition on collective ar
rangements that reduce fishery consumption, will further facilitate
private ordering in marine fisheries by reducing the costs of such
activities. So, too, would clarifying the legal rights and entitle
ments of existing and potential resource users through the creation
of ITQs or some other property-based management system. Such
institutional reforms should improve fishery management by cre
ating greater opportunities for those most dependent upon m a rine
resources to engage in stewardship and conservation efforts.

VI.

C ONCLUSION

Conservmg marine resources requires controlling access and
reducing output. At issue is who, or what institution, should es
tablish and enforce such controls. This is a question of institu
tional capacity as much as it is the inherent desirability of one
institutional framework over another. The American legal tradi
tion may disfavor property rights in wildlife, yet it may be the case
that reliance upon government regulation to conserve some livi~g
marine resources is to condemn them to exhaustion.
Given the historical failure of government regulation to ensure
sustainable utilization of fisheries, it is puzzling that existing law
199. Id.
200. Edwardb, supra note 34, a t 266.
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implicitly assumes that a politically influenced regulatory agency
or a management council is a better means of controlling output
than a self-interested owner, whether an individual, an associa
tion, or some other collective institution. A wealth of research on
natural resource management, including fishery management,
suggests that private owners will engage in better stewardship
than the political process. 201
Environmental problems are typically characterized as result
ing from "market failure" - a failur e of private institutions to safe
guard environmental resources. Yet the experience with marine
resources suggests that "government failure" or "political failure"
would be a more accurate diagnosis of the problem. It is not that
private institutions have failed, it is that we have failed to h ave
private institutions, and government policy is sometimes the
cause. 202 Moreover, the failure of private institutions to produce
"optimal" results in some, even many, instances does not mean
that political management will produce better outcomes;203 "the
relevant question is whether private or dering reaches a result that
is superior to the result public ordering reaches."204
Existing legal institutions need to leave room for private insti
tutions to operate. As Ellickson noted at the close of Order Without
Law, "lawmakers who are unappreciative of the social conditions
that foster informal cooperation are likely to create a world in
which there is both more law and less order ."205 Private ordering
will not solve every conservation concern - not even every fishery
problem - but it could well supplement government efforts, if not
replace them. Given the plight of marine fish er ies, it would be
folly to ignore a conservation tool as potentially powerful as private
ordering.

201. See infra Part II; see also Smith, supra note 16. See generally TERRY L.
ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPlTALISTS: DOI NG GOOD WHILE DOING
WELL (1997).
202. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion: Environmental Policy at the Crossroads , in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 177, 192 (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
203. See Demsetz, supra note 44, at 1-2.
204. Macey, supra note 85, a t 1141.
205. ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 286.

